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Gilbert  and  Katz  (2006)  (GK)  show  that  allowing  (pure)  patent  bundling  increases  the incentives  for  patent
owners  to enter  into  “long-term”  patent  licensing  that  commits  them  not  to  expropriate  licensees’  sunk
costs  in complementary  assets  with  opportunistic  licensing  terms.  We  interpret  RAND  commitments
as  a form  of  long-term  contracting,  and  extend  their  framework  to analyze  the  tying  of non-RAND-
committed  patents  to  RAND-committed  patents.  Pure  patent  bundling/tying  is  common  and  often  has
sound  efﬁciency  justiﬁcations,  so  we  caution  against  prohibiting  the pure  bundling  of  RAND-committed
and  non-RAND-committed  patents.  Whether  such a license  honors  a RAND  commitment  turns,  however,
on the  licensing  terms.  We  argue  that  including  a non-RAND-committed  patent  (patent  2)  in  a  bundle  with
a  RAND-committed  patent  (patent  1) does  not  increase  the license  fee that honors  the RAND  commitment.
If,  however,  the  patent  owner  offers  patent  1 separately  at a  RAND  rate,  its  RAND  commitment  does  not
restrict  what  it charges  for a bundle  of  patent  1 and  patent  2.icensing
undling
ying
AND
RAND
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).old-up
ntellectual property
. Introduction
In this paper, we address the relationship between two  com-
on  practices in patent licensing: RAND commitments and patent
undling. A RAND commitment is a commitment to license tech-
ology on “Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” terms1. Patent
undling (or, more precisely, pure patent bundling) is licensing
atents only in bundles (or portfolios) rather than offering licenses
o individual patents on an à la carte basis. We  ask whether, once
 patent owner makes a general commitment to license its patents
n RAND terms, it is permissible to offer those patents solely in a
undle with other patents. If so, what does the RAND commitment
mply for the royalties charged for the bundle? Alternatively, does
 RAND commitment necessarily oblige a patent holder to license
ts patent on a stand-alone basis?
To address the general issue of bundling RAND-committed
atents, we must understand why patent bundling is such a
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 617 353 4408; fax: +1 617 353 6667.
E-mail addresses: alayne-farrar@crai.com (A. Layne-Farrar), salinger@bu.edu
M.A. Salinger).
1 As we understand the nomenclature, RAND is synonymous with “FRAND,” which
s  an acronym for “Fair, Reasonable, And Non-Discriminatory.” Licensing terms that
re both “reasonable” and “non-discriminatory” are necessarily “fair.”
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.03.003
048-7333/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article ucommon phenomenon, what effect patent bundling has on licens-
ing terms, and why patent holders make RAND commitments.
A substantial and growing economics literature has emerged on
bundling in general, and some of it speciﬁcally focuses on bundling
intellectual property (like computer software, music, and video
entertainment), but the formal literature on patent bundling is
remarkably thin2. A notable exception is the Gilbert and Katz (2006)
(henceforth “GK”) model of patent bundling.
The GK model is a natural starting point for our analysis. A key
idea in the GK model is the distinction between “long-term” and
“short-term” patent licensing, which turns on whether the parties
enter into contracts before or after the patent user incurs sunk costs.
The patent owner can impose terms that expropriate the patent
user’s sunk costs with short-term contracts, but not with long-term
licensing.GK do not address how long-term licensing occurs in practice.
One possibility, of course, is that the patent user seeks a license
before starting to commercialize the technology. An alternative
2 Patent bundling is related to but different from patent pooling, which Shapiro
(2001) and Lerner and Tirole (2004) have analyzed. Patent pooling entails licensing
patents of different patent owners in a single package. Patent bundling refers to
licensing multiple patents of a single patent-owner as a package.
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The single rent principle was one of the key underpinnings of
the so-called Chicago critique of a wide range of antitrust policies,
including tying. Arguably the dominant interpretation of the156 A. Layne-Farrar, M.A. Salinger / 
echanism, however, is to make a RAND commitment. As a starting
oint3, we interpret a RAND commitment to mean a commitment
n the part of the patent owner not to charge higher licensing fees
r impose other terms that are more onerous than it would have
ought to impose before the patent user made irreversible deci-
ions (such as incurring sunk costs in complementary assets) to
se the patent4. Under this interpretation, the GK model provides
 general framework for analyzing RAND commitments, and the
atent license bundling in their model is of two RAND-committed
atents for technologies that are both needed to implement a single
tandard.
GK’s results are that the patent owner would offer its two  com-
lementary patents as a bundle rather than à la carte. Thus, the pure
undling of the two patents does not violate the patent-owner’s
ommitment to limit the license fee to what it would have sought
efore the patent user incurred any sunk costs. Moreover, they
how that banning bundled patent licensing (and thereby forcing
he patent owner to license its patents separately) might pre-
ent the patent holder from being willing to enter into long-term
icenses or, under our interpretation, to make RAND commitments.
s commitments to avoid expropriation can be necessary to induce
thers to invest in complementary assets, GK urge caution about
estrictions on patent bundling.
In this article, we adapt and extend the GK framework to address
 different question about patent license bundling. Our focus is not
he pure bundling of multiple RAND-committed patent licenses
ut, rather, the pure bundling of two patent licenses, one of which
s RAND-encumbered and one of which is not. Doing so requires
nalyzing the meaning of a RAND commitment on one patent
hen a patent owner has not made a similar commitment on
nother patent that a patent user might need to use with the RAND-
ommitted patent. Note that, while most commonly made in the
ontext of standard setting within cooperative standard develop-
ent organizations (SDOs), RAND pledges are not limited to SDOs,
n large part because SDOs are not the only way that standards
merge5.
We  analyze expropriation through tying as the outcome to what
e call the “Some Opportunism Game” in which the owner of two
atents can behave opportunistically in the licensing of one of its
atents but not the other. As a foundation for that game, we ana-
yze a “No Opportunism Game” that has the basic structure of the
K model but with only a single patent to license. The result of
his model brings out a key distinction between our model and
he GK model related to the meaning of a RAND commitment. In
articular, we show that there is no universal formula for RAND.
nstead, for some parameters, the RAND royalty is “value-based,”
eaning that it reﬂects the ex ante upper bound value created byhe patented technology. For other parameters, the RAND royalty is
cost-based,” meaning one that is low enough to eliminate a patent
ser’s incentive to try to invent around the patent.
3 This interpretation is consistent with Swanson and Baumol (2005). As we show
n Section 4, it has more complicated implications than one might expect, and these
omplications might cause some to argue for a reﬁnement on this interpretation of
AND.
4 In addition to sunk investments in complementary assets, irreversible decisions
nclude the decision not to try to invent around the patent and, as we  discuss in
ection 5, the decision to adopt one technology instead of an available alternative.
n  what follows, when we refer to a time before the patent user incurs sunk costs in
omplementary assets, we  are referring more generally to a time before the patent
ser makes any irreversible decision with respect to its use of the patent.
5 The Program for Information Justice and Intellectual Property at Washington
ollege of Law maintains a database of more than 150 such public non-SDO patent
ledges: http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/. Contreras (2015)
nd Elhauge (2015) discuss the legal basis for enforcing RAND commitments made
utside an SDO setting. For other discussions of non-SDO patent pledges, see Layne-
arrar (2014) and Harkrider (2013).ch Policy 45 (2016) 1155–1164
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 discusses the economics of bundling in general, highlighting
the aspects that we consider essential for understanding patent
bundling. Section 3 then explains the GK model and the role of
bundling in it. Section 4 presents the No Opportunism Game, bring-
ing out the distinction between value-based and cost-based RAND
royalties. Section 5 presents a modiﬁed version of the No Oppor-
tunism Game to show that our results apply in a wider set of
circumstances than might initially appear to be the case6. In Sec-
tion 6, which contains our main results, we  use the GK  framework
to analyze licensing two patents where the patent holder has made
a RAND commitment on just one.
Section 7 contains our conclusions. Brieﬂy, the pure bundling
of patent licenses raises a basic policy dilemma. On the one hand,
the practice could be a way  to renege on the RAND commitment.
On the other hand, as we  explain in Section 2, the pure bundling of
patents is prevalent because it can be an efﬁcient form of contract-
ing that minimizes transaction and litigation costs. We  argue that
because of these efﬁciencies, the owner of multiple patents should
be allowed to engage in pure bundling of patents with and without
RAND commitments, but that RAND commitments limit the license
fees that it can charge. Indeed, we  show that the license fees that
honor a RAND commitment on a bundle of RAND-committed and
non RAND-committed licenses may  be less than the RAND license
fee if the patent owner had made RAND commitments on both
patents.
2. Bundling and tying in general
While a complete review of the extensive economics literature
on bundling and tying is unnecessary for what follows, a few key
points are essential.
A key concept in the literature on bundling is the “single
monopoly proﬁt”7 (or, more generally, “single rent”8) theorem, and
this theorem plays an important role in the GK results. As is well
understood, if a company has a monopoly over two goods–call
them “A” and “B”—that consumers use together in ﬁxed propor-
tions, there is a combined price for the two goods that maximizes
the company’s proﬁts. Any combination of prices that sums to this
optimal bundled price will generate the same level of proﬁts (and
consumer surplus). Indeed, the company can earn this level of pro-
ﬁts on just one of the two  goods as long as the price of the other
good equals marginal cost.6 In the GK model and in the model in Section 4, the opportunity for opportunis-
tic  licensing arises because the patent user has to invest in sunk costs to earn any
commercial value from the technology. Another form of opportunism that is some-
times alleged (particularly in formal standard setting proceedings) arises when there
are multiple patents that compete for inclusion in a standard (with the one chosen
being essential). Prior to adoption of the standard, the licensing terms a patent owner
could negotiate are constrained by the available alternatives. Once a patent becomes
essential, however, the alternatives cease to be a constraint and the patent owner
has  an incentive to extract the entire value of the standard rather than its contribu-
tion to the value over the value that could have been realized with an alternative
patent. The model in Section 5 shows that we can interpret the opportunity cost of
not adopting an alternative patent as a sunk cost that has the same economic effect
as  the sunk costs in the GK and Section 4 models.
7 As evidenced by the title to Elhauge (2009) the term is widely recognized. How-
ever, we have not been able to document the source of the term. Whinston (1990)
attributes the arguments to a Chicago oral tradition. Bowman (1957) recognizes the
strong assumptions underlying the principle and a set of exceptions to it when those
assumptions do not apply.
8 While economists (as well as lawyers and courts) use the phrase “single
monopoly proﬁt,” we prefer the term “single rent” because the argument applies
to  rents of any kind, including patent royalties.
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rinciple is that it casts doubt on claims that the incentive to tie
oods together is “leveraging” or “foreclosure.” An alternative
nterpretation, however, is that the assumptions underlying the
ingle rent principle are so strong that relaxing them could undo
he principle.
Understanding the assumptions provides a framework for
nderstanding why a single source of rents may  not be sufﬁcient
o capture all the rents available. Farrell and Weiser (2003) and
lhauge (2009) have articulated this perspective at length, as did
rattenmaker and Salop (1986). One of the stronger assumptions
nderlying the single rent principle presumes that the monopoly
r property right on at least one of the goods is iron-clad. The
hreat of entry into both goods can violate this assumption, though
 threat of entry into just one of the goods does not. Suppose entry
nto A is not possible but entry into B is. According to the single
ent principle, the seller should welcome entry into B by a com-
any offering a lower-cost, higher quality, or differentiated version
ince the improvement in B would increase the proﬁts the seller
ould earn from A. But, the threat of entry in A as well can make it
mpossible for the ﬁrm to raise the price of A to take advantage of
ost reductions or improvements in B. With the potential for entry
nto both A and B, tying can raise entry barriers by forcing two-
tage entry. This exception to the single rent principle underlies
he analyses of Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Nalebuff (2004).
Failure of the single rent principle does not, however, necessar-
ly imply that modularized competition results in better outcomes.
ecause of double marginalization, the proﬁts a company can
arn by controlling the rights to both A and B exceed the total
roﬁts that separate owners of A and B would earn. Eliminating
ouble marginalization is the reason that patent pools can be in
he public interest. As Lerner and Tirole (2004) show, whether
atents are complements or substitutes is more subtle than in the
ase of consumer goods9. However, to the extent that bundles of
eparately-owned complementary patents can be combined in the
ublic interest, one must be cautious about condemning the tying
f commonly-owned patents10.
While the formal economics literature has focused on price
iscrimination and foreclosure as possible motives for tying, the
ractice is far too common for the specialized models in the price
iscrimination or foreclosure literature to explain them all. Instead,
ransactional and organizational efﬁciency is likely to explain much
ore of the tying that occurs in practice. Virtually no one wants
very section of a newspaper. Evans and Salinger (2005, 2008) argue
hat one cannot understand the diverse instances of tying without
9 Observe that Lerner and Tirole (2004) make a different, though related, point to
he  one we  focus on. Speciﬁcally, Proposition 5 in Lerner and Tirole (2004) estab-
ishes that a welfare enhancing patent pool contains complementary patents and is
trongly stable, such that the presence of individual patent licensing will not unravel
he pool, whereas a welfare decreasing pool contains patents that are substitutes
or  one another, in which case the presence of individual patent licensing will
nravel the pool, as licensees can obtain lower aggregate rates through individ-
al licensing of the subset of patents needed. In our model, the bundle (or “pooled”
atent license) can be used to achieve a higher rate when the patents are comple-
ents, not substitutes, such that the presence of individual licensing (here across
atents, rather than across patent holders) would unravel the bundle. The differ-
nce between Lerner and Tirole (2004) and our analysis stems from the presence
f  RAND commitments, something not included in Lerner and Tirole. As we argue
elow, combining RAND-encumbered patents with non-RAND-encumbered patents
an create a mechanism to avoid the RAND commitment.
10 To be sure, participants in patent pools often offer to license their patents sepa-
ately as well as part of the pool, and whether they do can be a factor in determining
hether a pool is in the public interest. See the discussion in Lerner and Tirole
2004). While at least one paper, Quint (2014), develops theory demonstrating that
he inclusion of patents that are not perfectly complementary need not be anti-
ompetitive or harmful, the general consensus is that pools should be restricted
o  essential patents to prevent foreclosure of alternative technologies for optional
eatures.ch Policy 45 (2016) 1155–1164 1157
recognizing the cost of product offering complexity. Before a ﬁrm
decides on how much to produce (or try to sell) and how much to
charge, it ﬁrst has to decide exactly what it sells. Even after deciding
on its general line of business, the products a ﬁrm offers are typically
a small subset of the products and product combinations it could
conceivably offer. Dell revolutionized the personal computer indus-
try by putting in place systems to customize orders to consumer
speciﬁcations to a degree that had previously been unimaginable.
But even Dell’s highly customized offerings did not include every
conceivable conﬁguration and, more importantly, Dell and the per-
sonal computer industry are the exception. In general, companies
do not and indeed cannot customize their offerings to the precise
desires of every (or, for that matter, any) customer.
While Evans and Salinger did not address the issue of tying
patents, the framework they suggest provides a plausible-indeed,
obvious-explanation for why patent tying is such a common phe-
nomenon. The key question to ask in regard to à la carte licensing
is, “What is the limiting principle?” Some large innovative com-
panies that license their technology have thousands of patents.
Yet, they might offer them in only a handful of bundles, and they
might not offer any of them individually. For a company with 1000
patents, the number of possible licensing combinations of patents
is on the order of 10301, which is about googol cubed! The notion
that the licensor is obligated to unbundle any arbitrary set and
offer a discount means that it would have to set 10301 different
prices and then monitor and enforce compliance for all those dif-
ferent conﬁgurations. As a practical matter, the number of different
combinations that licensees might demand would likely be much
smaller, but there is nonetheless a cost of having more complex
product offerings. As a result, patent licensors necessarily offer a
small subset of the patent bundles that they could conceivably
offer; and it should come as no surprise (and should not necessarily
be a public policy concern) if many licensees only use a subset of
the patents they license.
It also should not be surprising if licensees want inclusive bun-
dles. A licensee takes a license to (1) access useful technology
and (2) avoid being sued for patent infringement. A company that
licenses just a subset of the patents that it needs to implement
a technology risks a patent-infringement suit even if it pays the
royalties due on the patents it does license. As a result, licensees
might demand patents in an inclusive bundle that completely
protects them from the threat of a suit (referred to as “free-
dom to operate” licenses). To the extent that such bundles cover
both RAND-committed patents and non-RAND committed patents,
including all patents that a licensee might conceivably use is itself
a form of commitment on the part of a patent owner not to behave
opportunistically by suing for patent infringement on a non-RAND
committed patent that the licensee ends up infringing. Both the
licensor and the licensee can save transaction and enforcement
costs by licensing at the technology portfolio level.
3. The Gilbert-Katz (GK) model
With the motives for patent bundling in mind, we turn now to
patent hold-up. The Gilbert-Katz (GK) model addresses this topic
in the context of patent bundling. The possibility of patent hold-up
adds a layer of complexity to the implications of the single-rent
theorem because there are two  levels of rents to consider: the ex
ante rents before licensees engage in sunk investment (including
R&D efforts to invent around the patents) and the ex post rents after
they do11.
11 We start our analysis from the point in time that the patent holder has already
made its R&D investment and has a patent in hand. Thus, in our analysis here, “ex
ante” refers to the licensee’s investment, not the patent holder’s.
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incentive to commit not to expropriate the value of sunk invest-
ments, we  restrict attention to parameter values that create such
an incentive18. Thus, to capture the effects we are interested in,
13 The assumptions and the phenomenon that the GK model examines are similar
to  those explored by Choi and Stefanadis (2001), discussed above.
14 GK assume that R&D to invent around the IP-owner’s patents is entirely duplica-
tive and that it offers efﬁcient licensing terms that do not distort product prices.
(That is, they assume lump-sum license fees). Given these assumptions, the R&D to
invent around the IP-owner’s patents is socially wasteful and yields no consumer
beneﬁts. In practice, the R&D to avoid the need to license one or more of the IP-
owners patents might yield consumer beneﬁts. Even if that is so, however, the GK
results clarify why  allowing pure bundling in long-term licensing can make an IP
holder more willing to engage in the long-term licensing (perhaps by making RAND
commitments) needed to generate complementary investment.
15 GK allow for different levels of S and for B to be a function of S. The levels of sunk
cost that are optimal for both the licensee and society are then part of the model
solution. We assume a single possible value of S and B, which can be thought of as158 A. Layne-Farrar, M.A. Salinger / 
In the formal set up of the GK model, the owner of two  com-
lementary patents (“the patent owner”) can license to a single
icensee (the “manufacturer”). The technologies covered by the
atents are strongly complementary. That is, the technologies
reate value only in combination with each other. However, the
atents themselves are not strongly complementary as the man-
facturer can invest in R&D to try to invent around one or both
atents. The IP owner does not have manufacturing capability, so
t must license its technology to the manufacturer to capture any
alue from it. The value that can be realized from the technology is
 function of the level of complementary investment, which only
he manufacturer can make. If the manufacturer does not obtain
 license to the technology prior to investing in complementary
ssets, the IP owner might be able to expropriate the contribution
f the manufacturer’s investment. In other words, if the manufac-
urer does not obtain an early license, the patent holder can practice
old-up.
A simple numerical example illustrates the GK model, the intu-
tion behind it, and the role of patent tying in the GK framework.
uppose that without any investment by the manufacturer, the
atented technology yields a value of 20 (unrealizable by the patent
older, by assumption). With efﬁcient investment in complemen-
ary assets by the manufacturer, the technology embodied in an
nd product yields gross beneﬁts (i.e., before taking account of the
ost of the manufacturer’s investments) of 100 (unrealizable by the
anufacturer absent the initial contribution by the patent holder).
he commercialization investments needed to generate the addi-
ional value (the end product) have a cost of 30, so that the potential
et value of the combined technology (patent plus manufacture)
mbodied in the end product is 70.
Absent any frictions, the manufacturer would not invest 30 in
omplementary assets without obtaining a license for the patented
echnology. If it did so, the IP owner could insist on a license fee
f 100 (or just below it) and the manufacturer would rationally
ccept this offer. The IP owner has an incentive to commit up front
o a license fee of no more than 70 for the bundle (100–30), which
llows the manufacturer to recover its investment (and also to
hoose the most efﬁcient level of complementary investment)12.
K refer to licenses entered into before the manufacturer invests
s “long-term” licenses and licenses signed after the manufacturer
nvests as “short-term” licenses. As we have argued, we can inter-
ret their long-term licenses as RAND-committed licenses.
Up to this point, whether the technology is based on one patent
r two is irrelevant. The manufacturer needs both. Thus, whether
he IP owner offers the patents separately or in a bundle is also
rrelevant. It can offer the patents as a bundle at a license fee of 70
r à la carte with individual prices that add to a cumulative license
f 70. Proﬁts and consumer welfare (and, therefore, total surplus)
re all the same under the various options for charging a total of 70.
he irrelevance of bundling under these conditions is an application
f the single rent principle. One patent that is essential for a product
ives the patent holder the ability to extract the same total license
ee as it can with two such patents.
The feature of the GK model that makes bundling potentially rel-
vant is the ability of the manufacturer to invest in R&D to invent
round one or both patents. The outcome of the manufacturer’s
&D is random. For a given level of investment, the manufacturer
12 A simplifying assumption in GK is that the IP owner makes take-it-or-leave-it
ffers to the manufacturer, which implies that the IP owner is able to capture the
ntire available surplus. As they explain, the model would be more complicated if the
P  owner and manufacturer bargained over the available surplus, but the risk would
emain that the IP owner would expropriate part of the manufacturer’s investment
f  the manufacture invested prior to obtaining a license.ch Policy 45 (2016) 1155–1164
decides to invent around “patent 1,” “patent 2,” both, or neither13.
The manufacturer’s incentive to invest in R&D depends on whether
it has licensed the patents on a bundled or an à la carte basis. If
it licenses the bundle, it only earns a return on its R&D if it suc-
ceeds in inventing around both patents. If it licenses on an à la carte
basis, then successfully inventing around just one of the patents
will lower the license fees it owes the IP owner. Thus, holding the
total license fee constant, the manufacturer has more of an incen-
tive to invest in R&D under à la carte licensing than under bundled
licensing. The IP owner can limit the manufacturer’s incentive to
invest in R&D to invent around its patents by licensing them solely
as a bundle. In the GK model, the advantage the IP holder gets from
patent bundling is that it discourages attempts to invent around its
patents, and that beneﬁt is the IP owner’s incentive to enter into
long-term patent licenses14.
4. RAND commitments: The no opportunism game
In this section, we present a model of the No Opportunism Game
to clarify the meaning of a RAND commitment on a single patent.
The model closely mirrors the GK model except that there is only
one patent to be licensed instead of two.
Consider a patent that yields net beneﬁts of B but requires a
commercialization expenditure of sunk cost S15. With expenditure
R, the licensee can invent around the patent with probability p16.
Table 1 lays out the timing of the “No Opportunism Game.” At
Time 1, the patent owner sets a royalty, L. At Time 2, the manu-
facturer decides whether to invest in R&D to circumvent the patent
and in complementary inputs. If the manufacturer invests in R&D,
the outcome is revealed at Time 3. At Time 4, the manufacturer
decides whether to produce. The key feature of the game is that the
patent owner sets the royalty before the manufacturer invests in
complementary assets or R&D.
At Time 1, there are three levels of royalties to consider:
LE = B, LV = B − S, and LC = R/p.  (The subscripts denote “expropria-
tion,” “value,” and “cost,” respectively17.) Since our interest in
the No Opportunism Game is when the patent holder has anthe  optimized values.
16 GK allow for a range of R and let p be an increasing function of R. Just as we
assumed single possible values for S and B, we simplify the GK framework by assum-
ing single possible values for R and p. GK also assume that the patent holder’s patents
have some probability of not being valid or that the technology does not work. They
explicitly consider the possibility that the patent owner would offer a long-term
license that would obligate the patent user to pay a license fee regardless of whether
it uses the technology. They then derive the result that the patent owner would not
choose such a license if there is asymmetric information about whether the tech-
nology is good or the patents are valid. We assume that the technology is good and
the  patents are valid and we restrict licenses to those that require payment only
when the manufacturer actually uses the patents.
17 We explain why  R/p is cost-based below.
18 An alternative modeling approach would be to assume that the manufacturer
chooses S only after it observes the outcome of its R&D. Under that assumption, the
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Decision Set royalty L R&D, complemen
ssume that pB < R + S. When pB > R + S, the manufacturer would
nvest in both R&D and complementary assets even if the IP holder
hooses LE at Time 1, and the IP holder would, for some parameters,
hoose LE to charge B with probability (1 − p). The solution to the No
pportunism Game is the RAND rate; depending on the parameter
alues, that rate can be either LV or LC19.
Given the above parameter restriction (which allows us to focus
n the choice between LV and LC at Time 1), the sub-game perfect
olution of the game is as follows. At Time 4, the manufacturer
roduces if it has invested in invent-around R&D and the R&D
ucceeded. Alternatively, if either it did not invest in R&D or if
t invested and the R&D failed, it produces if L ≤ Lv = B − S. Since
he patent holder only gets a positive payoff if the manufacturer
roduces, it will choose L = Lv at Time 1. As a result, the manufac-
urer will produce at Time 4 and invest in complementary inputs
t Time 2.
If the manufacturer does not invest in R&D, its pay-
ff is B − S − L. If it does invest, its expected payoff is
(B − S − R) + (1 − p)(B − S − R − L). The value for L that makes the
anufacturer indifferent between investing and not investing is
C = R/p20.
If LC > LV, then the IP owner charges LV. Investing in R&D to invent
round the patent is not proﬁtable in this case, so the IP owner can
harge a value-based royalty and not face a risk of having its patent
nvented around. If LC < LV, then the IP owner gets an expected pay-
ff of (1 − p)LV if it chooses value licensing and LC if it chooses cost
icensing. It chooses cost-based licensing if:
B − S) ≥ R
p
≥ (1 − p)(B − S), (1)
nd L = Lv = B − S otherwise. If p* is the probability that makes the
atent owner indifferent between the value and cost-based license
ee, then the condition for p* is quadratic with roots:
∗ =
1 ±
√
1 − 4
(
R/ (B − S)
)
2
(2)
Based on the above discussion, we can establish:
roposition 1. At Time 1 in the No Opportunism Game, the patent
wner charges Lv = B − S when B − S ≤ R/p. It also charges Lv = B − S
hen B − S > R/p and p is within the range given by Eq. (2). Other-
ise, it charges Lc = R/p.
According to Proposition 1, the owner of a single patent would,
n seeking to negotiate license terms before the manufacturer
ncurs sunk costs or decides whether to invest in R&D, choose cost-
ased licenses in some cases and value-based licenses in others.
t would never seek to charge above the value-based royalty even
hen the cost-based is higher because the manufacturer would
P owner would never successfully charge a license fee of B. In Section 5, however, we
how that we can interpret S as the opportunity cost of not pursuing an alternative
tandard, and that interpretation is particularly relevant for cases when IP holders
ake RAND commitments. Under that interpretation, it would not be reasonable to
ssume that it is possible to delay the investment decision.
19 The condition for the value-based royalty to be greater than the cost-based roy-
lty is B − S > R/p. Note that the condition pB < R + S does not rule out this possibility.
20 Given that the patent owner is not going to charge above LV , the manufacturer
roduces regardless of whether its R&D succeeds. Thus, the expected value of the
&D is pL.Random Manufacturer
nvestment R&D succeeds or fails Production
never agree to pay more than the value-based royalty. One might
have guessed that long-term licensing would imply cost-based roy-
alties whenever the expected cost of inventing around a patent is
less than the value the patent creates (when the patent user in
fact practices it). According to Proposition 1, however, the patent
owner’s choice between a value-based and cost-based license is
more subtle.
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate this point. Fig. 1 shows a case when Eq.
(1) has no real roots. In that case, the patent owner chooses the
minimum of the cost-based and value-based fees (as one might
expect).
In Fig. 1, the horizontal line is the value-based royalty, the curve
is the cost-based royalty, and the downward-sloping line is the
patent owner’s expected royalty if it charges a value-based roy-
alty. For all values of p, the expected cost of inventing around the
patent exceeds the patent owner’s expected royalties if it charges
a value-based royalty. However, when the expected cost of invent-
ing around the patent exceeds B − S, the most the patent-holder can
charge is Lv = B − S. Given the parameter values underlying Fig. 1, the
patent owner maximizes its expected royalties with value-based
licensing when p is between 0 and 0.3 and with cost-based licensing
for values of p above 0.3.
Matters are more complicated in Fig. 2, however, where Eq. (1)
does have real roots. As in Fig. 1, the patent owner charges Lv when-
ever Lc > Lv (again, because the patent user would never accept a
license fee above Lv). However, in the range between the two real
roots in Fig. 2, the patent owner chooses Lv even though Lc < Lv.
When it does so, it sacriﬁces getting the cost-based royalty with cer-
tainty in order to get the value-based royalty with some probability
less than 1.
One can debate what this result implies about RAND royalties.
On the one hand, Proposition 1 formalizes the principle of setting
a non-opportunistic license fee as any royalty that does not exceed
what the patent holder would have sought under long-term con-
tracting. On the other hand, some might argue for a stricter view of
RAND as a commitment not to charge a rate that leaves an incen-
tive to invent around the patent. Under this stricter view, RAND
would be the lesser of the value-based and cost-based royalties.
In the context of standard setting, the patent holder is setting a
rate that would allow its patented technology to be chosen for the
standard. If it sets a rate too high, another SDO member (licensee
in our model) will attempt to develop its own technology to deﬁne
the standard or the SDO members will select an already available
alternative, in which case the patent holder would not be chosen
for the standard. (We  discuss this interpretation more formally in
the next section.)
5. Ex ante competition to be the standard—An alternative
interpretation of B and S
An important context for the debate over patent tying is
standard setting. In particular, technologies typically compete to
deﬁne a standard and RAND commitments can play an impor-
tant role in that competition. Many formal standard development
organizations request RAND commitments, and even outside of
such formal efforts unilateral RAND commitments can be crucial
in securing industry support for informal standard competitions
within a market (see footnote 4). This section addresses this con-
text, interpreting the model as deﬁning technologies competing to
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ecome a standard and considering how that competition impacts
he resulting RAND royalty rate.
The two essential features giving rise to the need for standards
re (1) competing technologies, each of which could serve as the
tandard, and (2) network externalities. The GK framework does not
xplicitly capture those elements, but can be extended to accom-
odate them. The “Standards Competition Game” introduced
elow captures both of these essential features; here the manufac-
urer’s sunk costs in the No Opportunism Game are reinterpreted
s the opportunity cost of not adopting an alternative technology
s the standard.Suppose that there are two competing technologies,  ˛ and ˇ,
nd that there are three types of customers, I, II, and III.  Correspond-
ngly, there are three types of manufacturers to cater to each type of
ustomer. Let Bi
jk
be the per person beneﬁt that Group i(i ∈ I, II, III)
Fig. 2. Cost-based vs. value-based ralties (no real roots to Eq. (1)).
gets from technology j(j ∈ ˛, ˇ) given that the standard is technol-
ogy k(k ∈ ˛, ˇ). Group I prefers  ˛ to  ˇ but is above all interested in
standardization, so BI˛˛ > B
I
ˇˇ
> BI
˛ˇ
. In contrast, Group II is loyal
to  ˛ and will choose it even if it is not the standard, while Group
III is similarly loyal to ˇ. That is, BII
˛ˇ
> BII
ˇˇ
and BIII
ˇ˛
> BIII˛˛. Let II
and III be the proportion of customers in Groups II and III (with
the proportion in Group I being (1 − II − III)).
To keep matters simple, we  assume that there is no additional
cost of adopting a standard other than the opportunity cost of not
adopting the alternative technology as the standard and that the
probability of inventing around the patent(s) is 0. Table 2 lays out
the timing of the game. At Time 1, the owners of both technologies
each offer a royalty (L˛ and Lˇ, respectively) conditional on being
accepted as the standard. Further assume that only Type I manufac-
turers participate in the standard setting effort, so that Type II and
oyalties (real roots to Eq. (1)).
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that does not entail investing in R&D to invent around patent 2. As
a result, the manufacturer has only three realistic options to con-
sider at Time 2. It can invest in complementary assets and R&D to
21 Assuming that the manufacturer can wait to learn the outcome of its R&D beforeDecision maker Patent owners Type I manufactur
Decision Set royalty L˛ , Lˇ Set std. on  ˛ or  ˇ
ype III manufacturers simply take the standard setting outcome
s given and have no voice in the cooperative development of the
tandard. Therefore, at Time 2, the Type I manufacturers choose
hich technology to adopt as the standard. At Time 3, the owner of
he technology not selected as the standard can choose a license fee
not bounded by RAND). At Time 4, manufacturers decide whether
o produce.
As with the No Opportunism Game, we assume a sub-game
erfect Nash equilibrium. The solution to the game is as follows.
uppose the Type I manufacturers choose  ˛ at Time 2. Then Type III
anufacturers produce at Time 4 (using the  ˇ technology, outside
f the standard) if Lˇ′ ≤ BIIIˇ˛ and shut down otherwise. Type I and
ype II manufacturers produce (using the standard  ˛ technology).
t Time 3, the owner of the  ˇ technology chooses Lˇ′ = BIIIˇ˛ (and
arns III BIIIˇ˛). At time 2, Type I producers select  ˛ if B
I
˛˛ − L˛ ≥
I
ˇˇ
− Lˇ, and select  ˇ otherwise.
Now consider Time 1. The owner of the  ˇ technology can guar-
ntee itself IIIBIIIˇ˛ even if is not chosen as the standard. If it offers
 royalty that induces the producer to accept it as a standard, how-
ver, it can increase its share from III to (1 − II). The lowest royalty
t is willing to offer to be the standard is:
˜
ˇ =
III
1 − II
BIIIˇ˛. (3)
If the owner of the  ˇ technology offers L˜ˇ, then to become the
tandard the owner of technology  ˛ would have to offer:
˛ = L˜ˇ + BI˛˛ − BIˇˇ = BI˛˛ −
(
BIˇˇ − L˜ˇ
)
(4)
as long as:
BI˛˛ −
(
BIˇˇ − L˜ˇ
)]
(1 − III) > IIBII˛ˇ. (5)
If the owner of technology  ˛ offered any royalty above that given
n Eq. (4), the owner of technology  ˇ would undercut it in order
o induce producers to accept it as a standard. Thus, given (5), no
oyalty for  ˛ can exceed the value given by Eq. (4). Since we  have
lready established that the owner of the  ˇ technology will not offer
 royalty below that given by Eq. (3) and that the royalty given by
4) is the best response by the owner of the  ˛ technology to the
oyalty given by Eq. (3), we have established:
roposition 2. At Time 1 in the Standards Competition Game, the
wner of technology  ˛ offers the royalty given by Eq. (4) and the
wner of technology  ˇ offers the royalty given by Eq. (3). The Type
 manufacturers choose the  ˛ technology as the standard, and the
wner of the  ˇ technology sets a royalty of BIII
ˇ˛
at Time 3.
Since we have assumed away the possibility of inventing around
he standard, the pricing at Time 1 in the Standards Competi-
ion Game corresponds to value pricing in the No Opportunism
ame, with BI˛˛ corresponding to B and to B
I
ˇˇ
− L˜ˇ corresponding
o S. Note that the opportunity cost of not adopting the alterna-
ive standard is the value net of the royalty (rather than the entire
alue). Introducing invent-around investment would yield results
onceptually analogous to those presented above. The intuition can
e either that the  ˛ technology is easy to invent around for the
urrent standard, or that it could be replaced in the next genera-
ion of the standard. Since we formulated the game with Bertrand
ompetition at Time 1, the royalty that the owner of  ˇ is assumedOwner of non-standard patent Manufacturers
Set royalty L˛’ or Lˇ ’ Produce or shut down
to command requires that  ˇ have some value even if it is not the
standard. If each patent has no value when it is not the standard,
then under the Standards Competition Game, patent holders would
be willing to offer a royalty-free license at Time 1. More generally,
if the patent owners compete against each other to be included
in multiple standards, licensing competition in practice might be
“softer” than what we have modeled. In practice, competition may
be over technologies with some outside value and hence patent
owners are unlikely to set their rates at royalty free.
6. RAND-committed and non-RAND committed patents:
The some opportunism game
Having formalized the meaning of a RAND commitment on a sin-
gle patent, we can now analyze tying a RAND-committed patent to
a non-RAND committed patent. To keep matters simple, we  assume
a sunk cost of complementary inputs (as in Section 4) without spec-
ifying whether they are out-of-pocket costs or the opportunity cost
of not adopting an alternative technology.
6.1. Analysis
Assume that the patent owner owns patents over two  tech-
nologies needed to capture value B with investment S into
complementary inputs (as in GK). Let R1 and R2 be the R&D expenses
needed to invent around each patent and p1 and p2 be the respec-
tive probabilities of success. Suppose the patent-owner makes a
RAND commitment on patent 1 but not patent 2.
Table 3 lays out the timing of the “Some Opportunism Game.” At
Time 1, the patent owner sets the license fee for patent 1. At Time
2, the manufacturer decides whether to invest in R&D with respect
to each patent and whether to invest in complementary inputs. It
can try to invent around both patents, patent 1, patent 2, or neither.
At Time 3, the results of the R&D become known (by everyone). At
Time 4, the patent owner then gets to choose a license fee for patent
221. At Time 5, the manufacturer decides whether to produce.
The manufacturer’s choice at Time 5 limits what the Patent
Owner can charge at Time 4, but it does not prevent hold-up. Sup-
pose that at Time 4 the manufacturer needs a license for patent 2,
but has invented around patent 1. In that case, the patent owner
can set the license fee for patent 2 at B. If, on the other hand, the
manufacturer needs a license to both patents, the patent holder
can set the license fee for patent 2 at B − L1. Either way, the patent
holder earns B and the manufacturer loses all its sunk costs (in
complementary inputs and any R&D it performed).
At Time 2, the manufacturer in principle has eight possible
choices. Without successful invention around patent 2, however,
the patent owner can expropriate any costs that the manufacturer
incurs at Time 2; we  can therefore immediately rule out any choicedeciding whether to invest in complementary inputs would not alter the results
qualitatively. Here, we assume that the manufacture decides whether to invest in the
complementary inputs at the same time that it makes its R&D decisions to accom-
modate the interpretation of S as the opportunity cost of not having selected an
alternative possible standard.
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Table 3
Some opportunism game.
Time 1 2 3 4 5
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effect going back in time to imagine what terms the patent owner
and manufacturer would have reached if they had contracted at an
earlier date. Answering that question requires an understanding
22 If the manufacturer can delay its investment in S until after it learns whether itsDecision maker Patent Owner Manufacturer 
Decision Set royalty L1 R&D for each patent, complementary in
nvent around both patents, it can invest in complementary assets
nd R&D to invent around patent 2 only, or it can not invest at all.
ith the ﬁrst option, there are four possibilities for the resolution
f uncertainty. With the second option, there are 2.
Suppose the manufacturer invests only in R&D to circumvent
atent 2, which implies that it will need to pay L1 if it chooses to
roduce. If the R&D is successful and it produces, the manufac-
urer’s payoff is B − S − L1 − R2. The patent owner’s pay-off is L1.
f the manufacturer’s R&D is not successful, the patent owner sets
2 = B − L1. In this case, the payoff to the manufacturer is −S − R2 and
he payoff to the patent holder is B. The manufacturer’s expected
ayoff if it invests in complementary assets and just patent 2 R&D
s p2(B − L1) − S − R2.
Now suppose the manufacturer invests in R&D to get around
oth patents. If both R&D efforts succeed, the manufacturer
oes not need either license. Its payoff is B − S − R1 − R2 and
he patent owner gets 0. If it successfully invests around patent
 only, the manufacturer needs a license to patent 1. In this
ase, its payoff is B − S − R1 − R2 − L1 and the patent owner gets
1. If the manufacturer’s patent 2 R&D fails then, regardless of
hether its patent 1 R&D succeeds, the patent owner chooses
n opportunistic license fee for patent 2. The patent owner gets
otal license fees of B and the payoff to the manufacturer is
S − R1 − R2. The manufacturer’s expected payoff if it invests in
omplementary assets and both patent 1 and patent 2 R&D is
1p2B + (1 − p1)p2(B − L1) − (S + R1 + R2).
Let Lv1 = B − (S + R2)/p2. With L1 = Lv1, which is value-based
icensing for patent 1, the manufacturer’s expected return from
nvesting in both complementary assets and patent 2 R&D equals
ts expected return from not investing at all. Let Lc1 = R1/p1p2. If
c
1 < L

1, then the manufacturer is indifferent between investing
nd not investing in patent 1 R&D when L1 = Lc1, which is cost-based
icensing.
As in the No Opportunism Game, the patent owner cannot
harge more than the value-based license fee for the RAND-
ncumbered patent. Thus, the cost-based license fee is only a
onsideration when it is less than the value-based license fee.
hen it is, the condition for the patent holder to get equal
xpected payoffs from value-based and cost-based licensing is
B − (S + R2)/p2](1 − p1) = R1/p1p2, which has roots:
∗
1 =
1 ±
√
1 − 4
(
R1/ (p2B − (S + R2))
)
2
(6)
Thus, we can state:
roposition 3. At Time 1 in the Some Opportunism Game,
he patent owner charges Lv1 = B − (S + R2)/p2 for patent 1 when
 − (S + R2)/p ≥ R1/p1p2. It also charges Lv1 = B − (S + R2)/p2 for
atent 1 when B − (S + R2)/p > R1/p1p2 and p1 lies within the range
eﬁned by Eq. (9). Otherwise, it charges LC1 = R1/p1p2 for patent 1.
t Time 4, the patent owner charges B for patent 2 if the manufac-
urer has successfully invented around patent 1 and B − L1 if it has
ot.
.2. InterpretationProposition 3 summarizes our results about the meaning of a
AND commitment on one patent when the licensee needs access
o a second technology to reap commercial value from the ﬁrstRandom Patent Owner Manufacturer
ent R&D succeeds or fails L2 Produce or shut down
patent. As in Proposition 1, the RAND royalty is sometimes cost-
based and sometimes value-based. However, the need for access to
the second technology affects both license fees.
The value-based RAND royalty is B − (S + R2)/p2 rather than B − S.
In effect, the technology 2 R&D becomes another sunk cost needed
to commercialize patent 1. The expected cost of successful technol-
ogy 2 R&D is R2/p2 and not just R2 because of the risk that the R&D
fails. Moreover, given our assumption that the manufacturer must
invest in complementary assets and patent 2 R&D at the same time,
the risk that the technology 2 R&D will fail also creates a risk that
the manufacturer will not be able to realize any value from its sunk
investment in complementary assets. As a result, the value-based
license requires subtracting out S/p2 rather than S from B22.
The need to invest in risky technology 2 R&D also affects the
cost-based license for patent 1. In Proposition 3, the cost-based roy-
alty is R1/p1p2 whereas it is R/p in Proposition 1. If it does not make
a RAND commitment on patent 2, the patent owner can charge an
opportunistic royalty of B for patent 2. As a result, the manufac-
turer’s investment in patent 1 R&D only saves it the cost of a patent
1 license fee when it successfully invests around both patents.
As in Proposition 1, the manufacturer cannot charge more than
the value-based fee because the manufacturer would never accept
it. However, for some parameter values when the cost-based roy-
alty is less than the value-based royalty, the patent owner might
still opt for the higher value-based royalty with probability (1 − p1)
than the lower cost-based royalty with certainty.
6.3. Comparison with RAND royalty on bundle of
RAND-committed patents
If the patent owner makes RAND commitments on both patents
1 and 2 and licenses them together as a bundle, then we  can inter-
pret Proposition 1 to indicate what the RAND royalty would be
for a license to a bundle of the two patents. We can interpret R
in Proposition 1 as R1 + R2 and p in Proposition 1 as p1p2. In that
case, the value-based royalty would still be B − S and the cost-based
royalty would be (R1 + R2)/p1p223.
The value-based license fee for patent 1 in the absence of a RAND
commitment on patent 2 is less than the value-based license fee
for the bundle of patents 1 and 2 given RAND commitments on
both. As a result, if a patent owner does offer licenses to its RAND-
committed patents only in bundles that include licenses to its non-
RAND-committed patents, it cannot justify its proposed license fee
on the grounds that it would have been RAND had it made RAND
commitments on both.
At ﬁrst, this result might seem paradoxical because it suggests
that a particular royalty for a license to a bundle of two patents
can be reasonable in some circumstances but not in others. But the
result is not paradoxical at all. Analyzing RAND royalties entails intechnology 2 R&D is successful, the value-based royalty would be B − S − R2/p2.
23 GK in effect impose the restriction (R1 + R2)/p1p2 > B − S, which implies that bun-
dle  licenses in their model are value-based. We do not impose this restriction and
believe that the distinction between value-based and cost-based RAND royalties is
an  important one.
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f what the expectations of both parties would have been at that
arlier time. The presence or absence of a RAND commitment on
atent 2 affects expectations and therefore the meaning of a RAND
ommitment on patent 1. Absent a RAND commitment on patent
, the manufacturer would expect to need to invent around patent
 in order to commercialize patent 1; and that expectation would
imit what the manufacturer would be willing to pay for a license
or patent 1.
One might wonder why the patent owner would not make a
AND commitment on patent 2 if doing so would increase the roy-
lty it could command from patent 1. Assuming the patent owner
as a choice of whether or not to commit to RAND for patent
, the logic for doing so is identical to the possible rationale for
hoosing value-based license fees when the cost-based fee would
e lower. In this case, the choice for the patent owner entails a
rade-off between a lower-fee with certainty and a higher fee with
ome probability below 1 but above 0. In the context of a coop-
rative standard, however, the patent owner may  have no choice:
t may  need to commit to RAND if the patent is disclosed for use
n the standard under development. Alternatively, patent 2 may
e non-essential for standard compliance in a technical sense, but
till complementary and highly useful from a commercial sense, in
hich case the patent owner need not make a RAND commitment.
. Conclusions and policy implications
The question we set out to answer is whether a patent owner
onors a RAND commitment if it offers its RAND-committed patent
n a bundle with non-RAND-committed patents. The question is,
owever, inherently incomplete.
First of all, offering a bundle of RAND-committed patents and
on-RAND-committed patents does not violate a RAND commit-
ent if the patent owner also offers the RAND-committed patent
eparately on RAND terms. Given the separate offering of RAND-
ommitted patents, the RAND commitment places no additional
estriction on the license fee the patent owner can seek for bundles
hat include the RAND-committed patents24.
Even if we restrict attention to the pure bundling of RAND-
ommitted and non-RAND-committed patents, however, the
uestion we set out to answer remains incomplete. For example,
ven though RAND commitments are not commitments to offer
oyalty-free licenses, a patent owner would honor its RAND com-
itment by offering a royalty-free license to a bundle of patents
hat includes both RAND-committed and non-RAND-committed
atents. Moreover, as we argued in Section 2, bundling (and espe-
ially pure bundling) can reduce transaction and litigation costs;
nd some patent users may  demand more inclusive licenses. Thus,
he issue to address is not pure bundling in and of itself but,
ather, the terms on which a patent owner can offer a pure bundle
f RAND-committed and non-RAND committed patents. In par-
icular, can the patent owner take a credit for the value of its
on-RAND-committed patents to determine an implicit license fee
or its RAND-committed patents and then claim to honor its RAND
24 Strictly speaking, “mixed bundling” entails offering all the components of a
undle separately in addition to the bundle. In the GK model and our simpliﬁed
xtension of it, mixed bundling would entail offering not only a license for the bun-
le  and a stand-alone license for patent 1, but also a stand-alone license for patent 2.
oving away from these simple models, however, a practical application of mixed
undling would entail offering a license to the portfolio of RAND-patents alone,
ffering a second license to the non-RAND patents (either as a portfolio or in ratio-
al  subsets), and offering a third license with a bundle of the RAND and non-RAND
atents together, rather than having to offer individual licenses of each RAND-
atent and each non-RAND patent, for the product offering cost reasons we  explain
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commitment if this implicit license fee is RAND? For three reasons,
our answer to this question is, “No.”
First, the reason a RAND commitment not to impose oppor-
tunistic license terms is important is precisely because of the
anticipation that the patent owner will have an incentive to impose
opportunistic license terms after the licensee sinks investment.
The opportunity to bundle other patents with RAND-committed
patents and claim credit for their value in determining RAND terms
for the bundle creates a clear risk of using bundling to circumvent
the commitment25.
Second, the credit given for the non-committed RAND patents
would require an assessment of their value. Absent a RAND com-
mitment on those patents, however, the patent owner can claim
an opportunistic value for such patents as their market value. The
patent owner is within its rights to claim such a stand-alone value
for a non-RAND-committed patent, but forcing the manufacturer
to pay such a fee in order to access the RAND-committed patent
would amount to reneging on the commitment not to impose an
opportunistic license fee.
Third, imposing a reasonableness requirement on the credit
given for the non-RAND-encumbered patent does not solve the
problem. As we show, the RAND license rate on patent 1 when
there is no RAND commitment on patent 2 is less than what the
RAND rate would be on the bundle if both patents had RAND com-
mitments. Had the patent owner made a RAND commitment on
patent 2, it would have reassured the manufacturer that it did not
need to develop the technology covered by patent 2 on its own
and could thus save the expense and risk of making investments
to do so. Not having made a RAND assurance, it is not reason-
able for the patent owner to extract the same value as if it had.
Put differently, if the patent holder is willing to “throw in” other
patents–either non-RAND committed patents or patents that are
committed for separate and distinct standards–“for free,” such that
the licensing terms for the bundle would be RAND with or without
the inclusion of the additional patents, the mere inclusion of addi-
tional licenses does not necessarily harm consumers. This is not a
mere theoretical possibility: given the transaction costs involved
in enforcing license agreements, as well as the complementarities
across patents in a given technology portfolio, licensors may  well
ﬁnd it is in their best interests to add in related non-RAND patents
“for free.” Symmetrically, licensees cannot demand a discount for
RAND-only licenses, as compared to RAND-plus licenses, without
ﬁrst establishing that the broader portfolio license rates and terms
are higher than the RAND-only rates and terms. As a practical mat-
ter, however, the complexities of establishing that a RAND-plus
license has RAND terms and conditions may push licensors more
toward mixed bundling, but the door to RAND-committed patent
tying should nonetheless remain open.
We  view our results as clarifying and extending the GK
arguments for tolerating patent bundling rather than either contra-
dicting or even qualifying them. The GK argument is that allowing
patent bundling encourages long-term patent licensing. To the
extent that RAND commitments are a form of long-term licens-
ing (or are analogous to such licenses), allowing pure bundling
of RAND-committed patents encourages patent owners to make
RAND commitments. Restricting the ability to increase licens-
ing fees on RAND-committed patents by claiming credit for the
value of non-RAND-committed patents that they bundle with
their RAND-committed patents forces patent holders to honor
those commitments. Lastly, our model clariﬁes the arguments that
licensees can and cannot make in pressing for a RAND license offer.
25 Farrell and Weiser (2003) refer to a similar exception to the single rent principle
as  the “Baxter exception.”
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